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WHAT
IS SPOLIATION?
Black's
Law Dictionary defines spoliation as the destruction or alteration of
evidence.3 Some states have developed working definitions of
spoliation through case law. For example, a California court decision
defined spoliation as the "failure to preserve property for another's
use in pending or future litigation".4 This definition has
also been adopted by Minnesota,5 and is notable because it
does not include any requirement of intent or bad faith on the part of
the spoliator. Conversely, Missouri and Texas case law requires an intentional
destruction of evidence to amount to spoliation.6
In
either event, any particular state's definition of spoliation can be ambiguous
and difficult to interpret while fashioning an investigation.
WHAT
IMPACT ON INSURANCE INDUSTRY?
In
order to deter spoliation, courts have fashioned sanctions to be imposed
upon the spoliating party. These sanctions range from jury instructions
which call for an inference that the spoliated evidence would have been
damaging to the spoliating party,7 to completely barring any
testimony by the spoliating party's experts,8 effectively resulting
in an adverse finding against that party.
A
court decision in Illinois considered the appropriateness of sanctions
barring the testimony of a subrogation plaintiff insurer's expert, where
the insurer allowed an automobile to be destroyed before the opposing
party had an opportunity to examine it.9 In imposing the sanctions,
the court held that the plaintiff, as an insurance company, "unquestionably
knew the importance of the car to any products liability claims to allow
potential defendants to prepare a defense". Even though the insurer saved
suspect wires from the car, and photographed it, the court held that the
insurer should have preserved the entire car to allow the opposing party
to inspect it.
HOW
MAY A DUTY ARISE?
The
starting point for any spoliation claim is determining whether a party
has a duty to preserve evidence. This duty can be imposed by statute,
such as civil procedure sanctions for failure to comply with discovery,
civil and criminal statutes prohibiting destruction of evidence, and rules
of professional conduct governing attorneys.10 It can also
be imposed by pre-existing contract,11 by an agreement between
the parties after the loss to preserve the evidence,12 by court
(protective) order after the loss,13 and/or by voluntarily
assuming the duty to preserve the evidence.14 A duty to preserve
evidence may also arise where there exists a potential for litigation
and the party knew or reasonably should have known of that potential.15
This means that if it is foreseeable that evidence could be needed for
a trial or a claim, then parties have a duty to preserve the evidence.16
Courts
in Alabama, Illinois and Massachusetts have held that a duty to preserve
evidence attaches at the point that an expert first begins an investigation,
if there is a potential for litigation.17
A
duty to preserve evidence may also be inferred through recommended practice.
For example, the NFPA 921 Committee has recommendations for preservation
of evidence in connection with the fire scene for investigation. Another
such example is the National Institute of Justice/Office of Science and
Technology and the National Center for Forensic Science which have begun
a joint initiative to create National Guidelines for collecting and preserving
evidence. The purpose of the Guidelines is to establish a standardized
approach to collecting and preserving evidence in the area of arson and
other crime scenes. It is therefore important to be aware of recommended
guidelines or practices which may be used to create at least an inference
of a duty to preserve evidence.
WHAT
MUST BE PRESERVED?
Several state court decisions have held that spoliation occurred when
"crucial" evidence was destroyed or altered.18 Examples of
crucial evidence include a heater that exploded,19 a furnace
that malfunctioned,20 a car that caught on fire,21
or a crimping machine alleged to have caused an injury.22 In
determining whether crucial evidence has been destroyed, an Alabama decision
held that where a party saved a component part of a gas system, but failed
to preserve the entire system, evidence was spoliated.23 The
reasoning under these holdings is that if a product is the focus of an
investigation, the entire product is crucial evidence.
HOW MUST EVIDENCE BE PRESERVED?
In
order to allow both parties equal opportunity for inspection, courts in
Illinois and Massachusetts have required that an expert may not deliberately
or negligently put himself in the position of being the only expert with
first-hand knowledge of the evidence in dispute.24
In
a Massachusetts case, the plaintiff's expert was in possession of the
seat belt at issue, and pursuant to his examination, performed destructive
testing.25 The defendant asserted that plaintiff's testing
of the seat belt so altered it, that the defendant's expert was effectively
precluded from making any useful examination. The court barred the plaintiff's
expert testimony at trial, holding that to allow the expert to testify
would allow the expert to substitute his own opinion or description in
place of the actual evidence.26
An
Illinois court decision concluded that even though the insurer inadvertently
misplaced component parts of the product at issue, the effect upon the
defendant was to deny them any opportunity to establish alternative cause
of the fire, and therefore it was proper to bar the insurer's expert testimony.27
One
Ohio court decision suggested that to avoid spoliation claims, parties
should agree to mutual inspections with both parties present for any testing
or manipulation of the evidence.28 In California, the court
suggested that the party holding the evidence should contact the opposing
party and impose a deadline for inspection, beyond which the opposing
party would have to bear the cost of preserving the evidence.29
LIMITS
ON THE DUTY TO PRESERVE?
Certain
court decisions find that although the duty to preserve crucial evidence
is expansive, it is not unlimited. The California and Illinois courts
have found limitations on liability for spoliation by stating that parties
are required to act "reasonably" in preserving evidence.30
In
an Illinois decision, the court held that where there was no showing of
bad faith by a party in discarding component parts of an allegedly defective
propane cylinder, evidence was not spoliated.31 The court found
that discarding the component parts was a reasonable action because at
the time the parts were destroyed, all the experts in the case had agreed
that the destroyed parts were not the cause of the fire. The court concluded
that a party "cannot be held to take extraordinary measures to preserve
items which were not relevant to either of the parties at the time they
were destroyed."32
Some
courts have held that while a party does not have a duty to preserve evidence
indefinitely, a party must hold it for a "reasonable" length of time.33
A court decision in Idaho held that where a party afforded the plaintiff
an opportunity to examine the evidence, and after one year the plaintiff
had not examined the evidence, it was reasonable for the party to notify
plaintiff that the evidence would be destroyed absent a timely response.34
WHEN
CAN SUIT FOR SPOLIATION BE BROUGHT?
Certain
states hold that unless the underlying cause of action is terminated,
any action for spoliation is premature, because actual injury cannot be
sufficiently alleged until the party has suffered an actual loss in order
to assess damages.35 Courts in Alaska, Florida, and Illinois
have held that a party need not necessarily first pursue the underlying
claim before bringing a spoliation action.36 Those courts held
that the cause of action for spoliation may be brought with the underlying
suit in order to allow the jury to hear common issues on causation and
damages concurrently. 37 In a recent Illinois Supreme Court
civil action, concurrent litigation of the spoliation claim was allowed,
but the court specifically required that sufficient facts be alleged to
show the loss or destruction of the evidence would create the inability
to prove the underlying lawsuit.38
Recently,
the California Supreme Court overruled a much-cited 1984 appellate court
decision, Smith v. Superior Court of California, in which the appellate
court recognized an independent cause of action for intentional first-party
spoliation of evidence.39 The issue before the California Supreme
Court was whether a party, who learns of spoliation during a lawsuit,
may bring an independent cause of action for spoliation. The Court held
that in such a situation, there is no need for an independent cause of
action because the trial judge can impose sanctions, or give an adverse
inference jury instruction to remedy the spoliation.
BEWARE
OF VARIABILITY IN APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS !
In
Illinois, for example, while its Supreme Court confirmed a "negligence"
standard for determining spoliation40, the Illinois appellate
decisions might be considered to be inconsistent, if not unclear in defining
sanctionable conduct.
In
weighing whether to impose discovery sanctions, the Illinois courts generally
consider whether spoliation of evidence deprived an opportunity to determine
alternative causes or defenses, resulting in substantial prejudice.41
Illinois courts seem to focus less on the conduct which caused the spoliation,
and more on the effect the spoliation had on the case. The reasoning is
that if a defendant is rendered unable to establish a defense or cause
of action because of spoliation, it is immaterial whether the acts intentional
or negligent.42
Consider
however, a recent Illinois Second District case, which predated the Illinois
Supreme Court decision confirming the negligence standard for spoliation.
The Appellate Court considered the spoliator's good faith and reversed
a trial court's imposition of sanctions for spoliation.43 The
court considered the damage done to defendant's case as a result of not
having access to the spoliated evidence, and additionally considered
the intent of the party that spoliated the evidence. While finding
there was no showing that the spoliator had not acted in good faith, the
court further found no substantial harm to defendant's case, since experts
for each party agreed that testing of acetylene torch hose was unnecessary.
A
subsequent case from the Illinois First District (Second Division) explicitly
rejected the idea that a court should consider the intent of the spoliating
party, stating that the Second District "appears to have used the plaintiff's
good faith as a gauge for measuring prejudice to the defendant."44
The First District further held that in determining the appropriateness
of discovery sanctions, a court should consider whether defendant's case
was substantially harmed by not having access to the spoliated evidence.
In this case, the defendants' experts had not yet tested or examined evidence
involved in an explosion when plaintiff allowed that evidence to be destroyed.
The warehouse storage facility inadvertently disposed of the artifacts.
The court held that it was appropriate to dismiss plaintiff's case because
defendant was denied any chance of developing a defense.
In
another almost concurrent Illinois First District (First Division) decision,
the court held that dismissal of the case was not appropriate, even though
plaintiff had performed destructive testing on an auto steering column
gear before defendant had a chance to examine it.45 The court
held that even though defendant was denied an opportunity to examine the
steering gear in its post-accident condition, the court would not presume
from the trial court record that the spoliation necessarily harmed defendant's
case to an extent would warrant dismissal of the suit against it. Rather,
the Appellate Court remanded back to the trial court for a hearing on
this issue. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court recently affirmed the
appellate court's conclusion that a potential litigant does nave a pre-suit
duty to preserve relevant evidence, and additionally affirmed the Appellate
Court's holding that an evidentiary hearing weighing the prejudice suffered
by the non-spoliating party must be conducted before imposing sanction.
The Court went on to delineate the six factors a trial court should use
in determining what sanction, if any, should be applied in the case of
spoliation. Those factors are: (1) the surprise the spoliation presents
to the adverse party; (2) the prejudicial effect of the spoliator's proffered
testimony or evidence; (3) the nature of the testimony or evidence; (4)
the diligence of the adverse party in seeking discovery; (5) the timeliness
of the adverse party'' objections to the testimony or evidence; and, (6)
the good faith of the party offering the testimony or evidence.46
Contrast
the above First District Appellate decision with a Fifth District Appellate
decision issued about five months earlier, also in which auto steering
column evidence was destroyed. The court here found spoliation to exist.47
It should be noted that the court focused on the fact that the defendant
spoliator had previously been served with a notice to preserve evidence
by the plaintiff. There was no analysis as to whether there was a showing
of prejudice to plaintiff's case. Rather, there was simply a deference
to the trial judge in determining sanctions.
Caution
should be used when navigating from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in defining
sanctionable conduct, since trial and appellate courts can be unpredictable
in their rulings. Being proactive and consistent in preserving evidence
is recommended.
DOES
FEDERAL OR STATE LAW APPLY?
The
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, suggested that while the
federal courts have the inherent power to preclude evidence for spoliation,
it is not clear whether the federal courts should apply state substantive
law or federal evidentiary law when imposing sanctions for destruction
of evidence in spoliation cases.48
In
a recent Seventh Circuit case out of Illinois, the court upheld the dismissal
of the insurer's subrogation claim. In doing so, it held that state law
governs issues that have a potential to alter the outcome of a case.49
The court determined that under Illinois law, a party has a pre-suit duty
to preserve evidence it reasonably should have known would be relevant
to the opposing party in preparing a defense. In this case, the insurer
failed to preserve all component parts after examining an allegedly defective
grill. The court held that at the time the insurer destroyed the component
parts, the cause of the grill malfunction had not been determined, and
their actions effectively precluded the other party from discovering alternative
causes of the malfunction.50
In
applying sanctions for spoliation, the Ninth Circuit required a showing
that the evidence was spoliated in bad faith before the trier of fact
may draw an adverse inference.51 The court seemed to apply
federal rather than state law. In this case, after the plaintiff's expert
disassembled a lighter at issue in a products liability claim, the defendant
argued that the evidence was spoliated.52 The court held that
while the plaintiff's expert had not been as careful as he should have
been, absent a showing of bad faith by the expert, the spoliation claim
was meritless, and therefore no adverse inference was warranted.53
CONCLUSIONS
1. Retain
legal counsel to evaluate the state (or applicable federal) law before
losses occur, if possible. In any event, retain counsel immediately after
notice of loss to assist in evaluating spoliation (and other) issues.
2. Determine
the specific basis of any restriction on spoliation with respect
to each loss as soon as possible. That is, search for any basis in pre-existing
contract or statutory or case law that might be binding on the parties.
Make sure your fire investigators are up to date on current recommended
practices for fire investigation. Check court records after the loss for
protective orders. Fully understand your rights/potential duties before
entering into any agreement with other parties, or approving the language
of a protective order. Make sure protective order or other agreement language
is as unambiguous as possible and understood by all of the parties and
their entire investigative teams. (Especially yours!)
3. Preserve
and carefully document chain of custody of evidence with photographs,
videotapes, affidavits and/or written agreements. Ensure that storage
of the evidence is not subject to potentially spoliating influences. Identify
and specify persons with keys to storage facilities and evaluate the facility
in terms of security.
4. Work
out written agreements with all potentially interested parties
(to any extent possible) concerning inspection and/or destruction of evidence.
Try to do this immediately after notice of loss, but in any event before
debris removal if at all possible. Develop and agree to a written
protocol for any "destructive testing" of the evidence, including a definition
of destruction testing. Strive to make the definition and protocol as
unambiguous as possible.
5. Give
all potentially interested parties to the loss reasonable written notice
(consider by certified mail) of destructive testing, or any other significant
action with respect to the evidence. Give reasonable time to respond.
6. If
your state allows for destruction of the evidence after some "reasonable
time," try to do so by agreement, and in any event, give reasonable written
notice to all potentially interested parties beforehand.
Endnotes
3. Black's
Law Dictionary 1401 (6th ed.1990).
4. Solano
v. Delaney, (California) 264 Cal.Rptr.721 (1989). (Unpublished
opinion.)
5. Federated
Mutual Insurance v. Litchfield Precision Components, (Minnesota)
456 N.W.2d 434 (1990).
6. Baugher
v. Gates Rubber Co., (Missouri) 863 S.W.2d 905 (1993), Williford
Energy Co. v. Submergible Cable Serv., (Texas) 895 S.W.2d 379
(1994).
7. Baugher
v. Gates Rubber Co., (Missouri) 863 S.W.2d 905 (1993), Federated
Mutual Insurance v. Litchfield Precision Components, (Minnesota)
456 N.W.2d 434 (1990), Miller v. Montgomery County, (Maryland)
64 Md.App. 202 (1985), Murray v. Farmer's Insurance Co., (Idaho)
118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101 (1990), Garcia v. Columbia Medical
Center of Sherman, (Texas) 966 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Tx. 1998) (Applying
Texas law), Kieffer v. Weston Land, Inc., (Wyoming) 90 F.3d
1496 (10th Cir. 1996) (Applying Wyoming law.)
8. American
Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec. 93,
585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992), Bolton v. Massachusetts Bay Trans.
Author., (Massachusetts) 593 N.E.2d 248 (1992),Fire Insurance
Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., (Nevada) 103 Nev. 648, 747 P.2d
911 (1987), Graves v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec.420, 526
N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist.1988), Nally v. Volkswagen of America,
(Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989), Shelbyville
Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.965,
634 N.E.2d 1319 (5th Dist.1994).
9. American
Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93,
585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992).
10. Bolton
v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Author., (Massachusetts) 593 N.E.2d
248 (1992), Bondu v. Gurvich, (Florida) 473 So.2d 1307 (1984),
Federated Mutual Insurance v. Litchfield Precision Components,
(Minnesota) 456 N.W.2d 434 (1990), Fire Insurance Exchange v. Zenith
Radio Corp., (Nevada) 103 Nev. 648, 747 P.2d 911 (1987), Graves
v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec. 420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist.
1988), Nally v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405
Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989), Ralston v. Casanova, (Illinois)
85 Ill.Dec. 76, 473 N.E.2d 444 (1st Dist.1984), Shelbyville Mutual
Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.965,
634 N.E.2d 1319 (5th Dist. 1994).
11. Continental
Insurance Co. v. Herman, (Florida) 576 So.2d 313 (1990), Miller
v. Allstate Insurance Co., (Florida) 573 So.2d 24 (1990).
12. Koplin
v. Rosel Well Perforators, (Kansas) 241 Kan.206, 734 P.2d. 1177
(1987), Murray v. Farmer's Insurance Co., (Idaho) 118 Idaho
224, 796 P.2d 101 (1990), Smith v. Superior Court of California,
(California) 198 Cal.Rptr. 829 (1984); overrul'd on other grounds,
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, (California), 74 Cal. Rptr, 2d 248 (1998).
13. Farley
Metals Inc. v. Barber Colman Co., (Illinois) 206 Ill. Dec.
712, 645 N.E.2d 964 (1st Dist. 1994), Ralston v.Casonova, (Illinois)
85 Ill. Dec. 76, 473 N.E.2d 444 (1st Dist. 1984).
14. Boyd
v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E. 2d
267 (1995).
15. American
Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93,
585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992), Boyd v. Travelers Insurance,
(Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995), Fire Insurance
Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., (Nevada) 103 Nev. 648, 747 P.2d
911 (1987), Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., (New Jersey) 266
N.J.Super.222, 628 A.2d 1108 (1993), Iowa Ham Canning, Inc. v.
Handtmann, Inc., (Illinois) 870 F.Supp. 238 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying
Illinois law), Solano v. Delaney, (California) 264 Cal.Rptr.
721 (1989) (unpublished opinion), Shimanovsky v. General Motors
Corp, (Illinois) 271 Ill. App. 3d 1, 648 N.E.2d 91 (1st
Dist. 1994), aff'd as modif'd 692 N.E.2d 286 (1998), Callahan v.
Home Depot, (New Jersey) 306 N.J. Super. 488, 703 A.2d 1014 (1997).
16. American
Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93,
585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992), Boyd v. Travelers Insurance,
(Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995), Fire Insurance
Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp., (Nevada) 103 Nev. 648, 747 P.2d
911 (1987), Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., (New Jersey) 266
N.J.Super.222, 628 A.2d 1108 (1993), Solano v. Delaney, (California)
264 Cal.Rptr. 721 (1989) (unpublished opinion). Callahan v. Home
Depot, (New Jersey) 306 N.J. Super. 488, 703 A.2d 1014 (1997).
17. Cincinnati
Insurance Co. v. Synergy Gas, (Alabama) 585 So.2d 822 (1991),
Graves v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec. 420, 526 N.E.2d 679
(3rd Dist.1988), Nally v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts)
405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d 1017 (1989).
18. American
Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93,
585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992), Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co.,(Missouri)
863 S.W.2d 905 (1993), Boyd v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois)
166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d 267 (1995), Graves v. Daley, (Illinois)
122 Ill.Dec.420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist.1988).
19. Boyd
v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d
267 (1995).
20. Graves
v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec.420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist.1988).
21. American
Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois) 166 Ill.Dec.93,
585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist.1992).
22. Baugher
v. Gates Rubber Co., (Missouri) 863 S.W.2d 905 (1993).
23. Cincinnati
Insurance Company v. Synergy Gas, (Alabama) 585 So.2d 822 (1991).
24. Nally
v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d
1017 (1989), Shelbyville Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products,
(Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.965, 634 N.E.2d 1319 (5th Dist.1994).
25. Nally
v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d
1017 (1989).
26. Nally
v. Volkswagen of America, (Massachusetts) 405 Mass.191, 539 N.E.2d
1017 (1989).
27. Shelbyville
Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.965,
634 N.E.2d 1319 (5th Dist.1994).
28. Bright
v. Ford Motor Co., (Ohio) 63 Ohio App.3d 256, 578 N.E.2d 547 (1990).
29. Solano
v. Delaney, (California) 264 Cal.Rptr. 721 (1989) (unpublished
opinion).
30. H
& H Sand and Gravel Haulers v. Coyne Cylinder, (Illinois)
198 Ill.Dec.367, 632 N.E.2d 697 (2nd Dist.1994), Solano v. Delaney,
(California) 264 Cal.Rptr. 721 (1989) (unpublished opinion).
31. H
& H Sand and Gravel Haulers v. Coyne Cylinder, (Illinois)
198 Ill.Dec. 367, 632 N.E.2d 697 (2nd Dist.1994).
32. H
& H Sand and Gravel Haulers v. Coyne Cylinder, (Illinois)
198 Ill.Dec.367, 632 N.E.2d 697 (2nd Dist.1994).
33. Murray
v. Farmer's Insurance Co., (Idaho) 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101
(1990), Solano v. Delaney, (California) 264 Cal.Rptr.721 (1989)
(unpublished opinion).
34. Murray
v. Farmer's Insurance Co., (Idaho) 118 Idaho 224, 796 P.2d 101
(1990).
35. Baugher
v. Gates Rubber Co., (Missouri) 863 S.W.2d 905 (1993), Tomas
v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance, (Ohio) 79 Ohio App.3d 624, 607
N.E.2d 944 (1992).
36. Hazen
v. Municipality of Anchorage, (Alaska) 718 P.2d 456 (1986), Miller
v. Allstate Insurance Co., (Florida) 573 So.2d 24 (1990), Boyd
v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d
267 (1995).
37. Hazen
v. Municipality of Anchorage, (Alaska) 718 P.2d 456 (1986), Miller
v. Allstate Insurance Co., (Florida) 573 So.2d 24 (1990), Boyd
v. Travelers Insurance, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d
267 (1995).
38. Boyd
v. Travelers Insurance Co, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d
267 (1995).
39. Cedars-Sinai
Medical Center v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, (California),
74 Cal. Rptr, 2d 248 (1998).
40. Boyd
v. Travelers Insurance Co, (Illinois) 166 Ill.2d 188, 652 N.E.2d
267 (1995).
41. Graves
v. Daley, (Illinois) 122 Ill.Dec.420, 526 N.E.2d 679 (3rd Dist.
1988); American Family Insurance v. Village Pontiac, (Illinois)
166 Ill.Dec. 93, 585 N.E.2d 1115 (2nd Dist. 1992); Shelbyville
Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.
965, 634 N.E. 2d 1319 (5th Dist. 1994); Farley Metals, Inc. v.
Barber Colman Co., (Illinois) 269 Ill.App.3d 104, 645 N.E.2d 964
(1st Dist. 1994); Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., (Illinois)
271 Ill.App.3d 1, 648 N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1994), aff'd as modif'd
692 N.E.2d 286 (1998); H&H Sand and Gravel Haulers
Co. v. Coyne Cylinder Co., (Illinois) 260 Ill.App.3d 235, 632
N.E.2d 367 (2nd Dist. 1994).
42. Shelbyville
Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products, (Illinois) 199 Ill.Dec.
965, 634 N.E. 2d 1319 (5th Dist. 1994); Farley Metals, Inc. v.
Barber Colman Co., (Illinois) 269 Ill.App.3d 104, 645 N.E.2d 964
(1st Dist. 1994)
43. H&H
Sand and Gravel Haulers v. Coyne Cylinder, (Illinois) 260 Ill.App.3d.
235, 632 N.E.2d 697 (2nd Dist. 1994).
44. Farley
Metals, Inc. v. Barber Colman Co., (Illinois) 269 Ill.App.3d 104,
645 N.E.2d 964 (1st Dist. 1994).
45. Shimanovsky
v. General Motors Corp., (Illinois) 271 Ill.App.3d 1, 648
N.E.2d 91 (1st Dist. 1994), aff'd as modif'd 692 N.E.2d 286 (1998).
46. Shimanovsky
v. General Motors, (Illinois) 271 Ill.App.3d 1, 648 N.E.2d 91 (1st
Dist. 1994), aff'd as modif'd 692 N.E.2d 286 (1998).
47.
King v. Clemons, (Illinois), 264 Ill. App. 3d 138, 636 N.E.2d
1062 (5th dist. 1994).
48. Schmid
v. Milwaukee Electric Tools, 13 F.3d 76 (3rd Cir.1994).
49. Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F. 3d 804 (7th Cir. 1995).
50. Allstate
Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 1995).
51. Glover
v. Bic Corp., 987 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1993), superceded by 6 F.3d
1318 (9th Cir.1993).
52. Glover
v. Bic Corp., 987 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1993), superceded by 6 F.3d
1318 (9th Cir.1993).
53. Glover
v. Bic Corp., 987 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1993), superceded by 6 F.3d
1318 (9th Cir. 1993).
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